In Part I of this two-part paper on confidential communication over wireless channels, we studied the fundamental security limits of quasi-static fading channels from the point of view of outage secrecy capacity with perfect and imperfect channel state information. In Part II, we develop a practical secret key agreement protocol for Gaussian and quasi-static fading wiretap channels. The protocol uses a four-step procedure to secure communications: establish common randomness via an opportunistic transmission, perform message reconciliation, establish a common key via privacy amplification, and use of the key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bob to agree on a common k-bit key about which Eve's entropy is maximal. In key distribution, the k bits can be unknown to Alice before transmission, this is in contrast to secure message communication where
Alice has a k-bit message that she wants to communicate to Bob, we focus only on the former. Powerful tools such as common randomness, advantage distillation and privacy amplification were developed in the context of key distribution over wiretap channels ( [15] , [16] ) and will be discussed, as they form the basis for much of the practical secret key agreement protocol proposed in this paper. Most of the key agreement protocols require some level of interactive communication between Alice and Bob to arrive at a common but secret key [13] , where they exchange information by way of a parallel, error-free public channel between Alice and Bob during the key agreement phase (e.g. [17] ). One key advance in this paper is that we focus exclusively on protocols that require only one-way, feed-forward communication from Alice to Bob across the noisy wireless channel and there is no need for a noiseless, authenticated public channel.
A. Our Contributions
Our main contributions are as follows:
• Development of a secret key agreement protocol for the Gaussian channel that performs close to the fundamental secrecy capacity limits (determined in Part I) over a wide range of channel values.
The communication is from the transmitter-to-receiver only and requires no feedback or error-free side channels.
• Adaptation of the secret key agreement protocol for the Gaussian channel to the quasi-static fading channel with perfect channel state information. In some cases this protocol comes close to the fundamental limits of the wireless fading channels presented in Part I. Again, the communication is from the transmitter-to-receiver only and requires no feedback or error-free side channels.
• Extension of the secret key agreement protocol for the quasi-static fading channel to the case of imperfect channel information.
• Development of new security and communication metrics, such as average η-secure throughput and average η-communication throughput for average secret and non-secret bits, respectively, transmitted per channel use on the wiretap channel.
B. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we consider a one-way protocol for key agreement for the Gaussian channel. In Section III we give a new reconciliation procedure for the Gaussian channel that is based on multilevel coding and LDPC codes. In Section IV we extend this protocol in an opportunistic way to the quasi-static fading channel and show that in some instances (when both the main and wiretapper's channel have low SNR) that the protocol comes very close to the secrecy capacity. We also show how the effect of imperfect channel knowledge on the performance of the protocol. Finally we provide concluding remarks and next steps.
II. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER GAUSSIAN CHANNELS
As a prelude to the problem of coding for the quasi-static fading wiretap channel, we develop a protocol for the Gaussian wiretap channel shown in Figure 1 . It is assumed that both channels are discrete time additive Gaussian noise channels with an average transmitted power constraint of 1 and the noise on Eve's channel is independent of the noise on the main channel between Alice and Bob. The noise variances for the main and wiretap channel are denoted respectively N M and N W . Furthermore we assume that Eve's wiretapper's channel is worse than the main channel, namely N W > N M . This critical assumption is necessary to ensure that the secrecy capacity is strictly positive [18] . If noiseless feedback is allowed between Bob and Alice, then N M > N W is permitted and the secrecy capacity can be positive [13] , however we consider only the case of one-way, noisy communications from Alice to Bob and N W > N M . There are a number of practical scenarios where this assumption is valid, for example radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and readers with a passive eavesdropper [19] .
Although the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel has been fully characterized [18] , designing practical coding schemes is still an open problem. On the other hand, previous results on secret key agreement by public discussion [13] and privacy amplification [16] naturally suggest a four step approach to secure communication over a wiretap channel: randomness sharing, information reconciliation, privacy amplification, secure communication. In this section we show how to adapt these to the Gaussian channel. The following protocol exploits a more general and more efficient version of the information reconciliation method of [17] and is shown in Figure 2 . Some of the four steps are adapted directly from previous work and not modified, while others require further development as given later in the paper.
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Bit mapping 1. Randomness sharing. The existence of common information between Alice and Bob is the key ingredient required for secret key agreement. In a wiretap scenario, Alice can generate this shared randomness by transmitting a sequence X n = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) of n i.i.d. realizations of a discrete random variable X over the main channel, which will provide Bob and Eve with sequences of correlated Figure 2 the dotted lines indicate the transmission across the Gaussian channel to Bob (and Eve, not shown here).
Since the amount of secrecy extractable from this common randomness is known to be at least [13] 
the mutual information I(X; Y M ) should be maximized and Alice should therefore choose X achieving the capacity C M = 0.5 log 2 (1 + 1/N M ) of the main channel. Matching C M exactly is only possible with continuous Gaussian random variables, however the set X and the probability mass function of X can be optimized so that I(X; Y M ) lies within hundredth of bits of the channel capacity C M even with a discrete distribution. For a fixed number of constellation points N c = |X |, this optimization can be performed with the algorithm proposed in [20] , however a very good approximation of the optimum can simply be obtained by expanding a uniformly spaced amplitude shift keying (ASK) constellation
by a factor α ∈ R + , and using a Maxwell-Boltzmann probability distribution
Even though I(X; Y M ) is not a convex function of α and λ, non-linear programming seems to be relatively insensitive to the initialization of the optimization. Clearly, N c should be large enough so that I(X; Y M ) can approach C M within the required precision, its exact choice will be discussed in the Section III. [21] . The channel noise introduces discrepancies between Bob's received symbols Y n M and Alice's symbols X n . The first step is for Bob to estimate Alice's symbolsX n = X 1 , . . . ,X n based on Y n M . The channel noise results in discrepancies in the correlated bit sequences X n andX n that Alice and Bob will correct and reconcile before any further processing. This requires an additional exchange of information between Alice and Bob as shown in Figure 2 , which is also made available to Eve. This situation can be viewed as a special case of source coding with side-information, where Alice compresses her source X n and Bob decodes it with the help of correlated side information Y n M . The Slepian-Wolf theorem [22] yields a lower bound on the total number of bits M rec which have to be exchanged:
Information reconciliation
Notice that the result of [22] only applies to discrete random variables whereas here Y M is continuous.
The variable Y M can however be quantized into a discrete random variable Y q such that H(X|Y q ) approaches H(X|Y M ) with arbitrary precision, and the Slepian-Wolf Theorem still holds.
Practical reconciliation algorithms will introduce an overhead ǫ rec > 0 and require the transmission of M rec = nH(X|Y M )(1 + ǫ rec ) additional bits. The reconciliation can also be characterized by its efficiency β which is defined as
At the end of the reconciliation step, Alice an Bob share with high probability the common sequence X n whose entropy is n rec = nH(X). We will assume that X n is then compressed into a n rec -bits binary sequence S. For our application to the Gaussian wiretap channel we use multilevel coding (at Alice) and multistage (MS) decoding (at Bob) to reconcile and correct the differences betweenX and X and this is discussed in detail in Section III. [16] . This last operation allows Alice and Bob to extract a secret key from the binary sequence S. The principle of privacy amplification is to apply a well-chosen compression function g : {0, 1} nrec → {0, 1} k (k < n rec ) to the reconciled bit sequence, such that the eavesdroppers obtains negligible information about the final k-bit sequence g(S). In practice this can be achieved by choosing g at random within a universal family of hash functions [23] , as stated in the following theorem. is know to be at least c, and Alice and Bob choose K = G(S) as their secret key, where G is a hash function chosen at random from a universal family of hash functions G : {0, 1} nrec → {0, 1} k , then
Privacy amplification
The total information available to Eve E consists in the sequence Y n W received during the first stage of the protocol, as well as the additional bits echanged during reconciliation, represented by the random
The quantity log 2 |M | represents the number of bits intercepted by Eve during the reconciliation, which is at most nH(X|Y m )(1 + ǫ rec ) if she intercepted all the information. Evaluating R(S|Y n W = y n W ) is in general still difficult, however conditioned on the typicality of the bit sequence [25] R(S|Y n W = y n W ) and H(S|Y n W = y n W ) become equal. Hence if n is large enough, nH(X|Y W ) − nH(X|Y M )(1 + ǫ rec ) − 2s − 2 is a good lower bound of R(S|E = e), and choosing
guarantees that Eve's uncertainty on the key is greater than k − 2 −r0 / ln 2 with probability 1 − 2 −s .
For our protocol in this paper we do not develop anything new, and we use standard families of hash functions [23] , [26] .
Secure communication.
The secret key generated K = G(S) can finally be used to secure Alice's message, using either a one-time pad for perfect secrecy or a standard secret key encryption algorithm and Eve's uncertainty H(K|G, E = e) about the key is as close to k as we want as per (5).
III. LDPC CONSTRUCTIONS FOR GAUSSIAN RECONCILIATION
In this section we develop an efficient reconciliation approach for Step 2 of the key agreement. The reconciliation of binary random variables has been extensively studied and several efficient methods have been proposed [21] , [27] , however little attention has been devoted to the practical reconciliation of non-binary random variables [17] . As stated previously the goal is given a non-binary variable X with distribution given by Eq. (2) and a random variable Y M obtained by sending X through an additive
Gaussian channel with noise variance N M , to generate a minimum amount of (parity) information to be sent to Bob so that X can be recovered from Y M and this additional information.
A. Multilevel LDPC Codes for Slepian-Wolf Compression
We assume here that Alice and Bob have, respectively, access to the outcomes x n = {x i } i=0...n−1 ∈ X n and y n = {y i } i=0...n−1 ∈ R n of instances of the random variables X N and Y n M . Alice sould then send Bob additional information to help him recover x n based on y n , and we can assume without restriction that Bob recovers a binary description of x n . Since each element of X can be uniquely described by a m-bit label (m ≥ log 2 |X |), we introduce the m labeling functions ℓ k : X → {0, 1} (k ∈ {0 . . . m − 1}), which associate to any element of X the kth bit of its binary label. As suggested in [28] , we can then use the syndromes of {ℓ k (x i )} In what follows we will describe a reconciliation algorithm adapted from the last scheme. This choice was motivated by the fact that BICM is known to be suboptimal over the Gaussian channel, hence the reconciliation of the variables X and Y M with a BICM-like scheme would always require strictly more that H(X|Y M ) additional bits per symbol. Moreover MLC/MSD is based on several components codes and therefore offers more flexibility on the code design than BICM.
The proposed reconciliation algorithm is a MLC/MSD-like reconciliation that uses binary LDPC component codes. Other classes of codes such as Turbo-Codes could be used as well, however LDPC have already proved their good performance for error-correction and side information coding [31] , and the Belief-Propagation algorithm can easily be generalized to account for the correlation between the sub-sequences {ℓ k (x i )} i=0...n−1 (k ∈ {0 . . . m − 1}). We use the following notations to describe the algorithm:
• c(k) represents the number of check nodes at the kth level (c(k) depends on the rate R k of the code used at level k and will be discussed in the next section),
denotes the message from a variable node v k i (i ∈ {0 . . . n − 1}) to a check node c k j (j ∈ {0 . . . c(k) − 1}) of the kth level at the lth iteration , and similarly m The m levels are then decoded successively, and the update equations of the messages at the lth iteration of the belief propagation at a given level k are described below :
where
If the Tanner graphs of the LDPC component codes are trees, it can be shown that the values λ
converge to the true a posteriori probabilities :
in a finite number of iterations, and the decision on the value of b k i can finally made based on the sign of λ , which takes into account not only the intrinsic information available from the observation y i , but also from the decoding of the other levels p = k. Eq. (11) is similar to the update rule of a singleinput single-output (SISO) demodulator, however it should be noted that it involves the joint probability p(y,x) (and not the conditional probability p(y|x)) to take into account the non-uniform distribution of the symbols in X . In theory, it should be sufficient to decode each level only once, however in practice performing several iterations between the levels might help improve the performance of the overall scheme. These practical issues will be discussed in the next section. Let us finally point out that the algorithms described in [32] , [33] , [31] can all be viewed as special cases of this general algorithm.
B. Rate Assignment
The optimal code rates required for each sub-sequence {ℓ k (x i )} i=0...n−1 are those required for MultiStage Decoding. In fact, from the chain rule of entropy we have :
Hence the H(X|Y M ) bits per symbol required for reconciliation can be obtained by disclosing succes-
The optimal code rate required at each level k is therefore :
Eq. (13) guarantees the optimality of the reconciliation scheme for any labeling, however the practical efficiency of the reconciliation strongly depends on the mapping used. In fact the performance of the reconciliation relies on our ability to construct capacity approaching codes for all levels k, which might not be possible if the required rates are too low. We investigated several labeling strategies and found out that the natural binary mapping was the best compromise. This mapping assigns to each symbol x j ∈ X the m-bit representation of j + (2 m − |X |)/2, and ℓ k (x j ) is then the kth label bit (ℓ 0 (x j ) is the least significant bit). Figure 4 shows the rates required for a constellation of size 10, with symbols and probabilities given in table I, as a function of the signal to noise ratio 10 log 10 (1/N M ). Over a wide range of SNRs, the optimal rates of the two uppermost levels are equal to 1, which greatly simplifies code design by effectively requiring only two codes. We carried out extensive simulations, The natural mapping has the property of preserving the symmetry on the probability distribution of the random variable X:
When first decoding the 0th level, this property implies that the equivalent channel seen by the bits is output-symmetric and that these bits are also uniformly distributed. In this case the probability of decoding error is the same for linear LDPC codes and LDPC coset codes, which allows us to use linear LDPC codes designed with the standard density evolution method [34] . This property no more holds when decoding the following levels, however recent results suggest that linear LDPC codes may still perform well with our coset coding scheme [35] . In order to further simplify the code design, we used irregular LDPC codes optimized for antipodal signaling over the AWGN channel as component codes.
The block length used was 200,000 and graphs were randomly generated while avoiding cycles of length two and four. Despite this long block length, the perfomances of all constructed codes were still well below those of their ideal capacity achieving counterparts, and perfect error-correction can therefore only be achieved by using lower rates codes at each level. Cutting down the rate of all component codes would disclose far too many bits, however a careful choise of the code taking into account multiple iterations between levels make it possible to maintain a good efficiency.
The practical code rate assignment is based on an analysis of the decoding process using EXIT charts [36] . Although there exist no theoretical results associated with EXIT charts for the Gaussian channel, they are a convenient tool to predict the exchange of information between the demappers and decoders involved in an iterative decoding scheme, based on how much extrinsic information (I E ) they compute from a priori information (I A ). There is no closed-form expression of the EXIT curve
of the demapper characterized by Eq. (11) and of the LDPC EXIT curve I E = T c (I A ) for 100 iterations, however they can be obtained via Monte-Carlo simulations assuming Gaussian a priori information [36] . Example of transfer curves are shown in Figure 5 . We observed that low rate codes gather extrinsic information at a slower pace than high-rate codes, therefore we decided to correct all errors by reducing the rate of the highest-rate code and by using iterations between levels to compensate for the poor performance of the lower rate code.
Let us now illustrate how code rates can be chosen on an example. We consider the situation where the SNR is 13 dB, for which the optimal constellation is given in table I. One would in theory need two ideal codes with rate 0.264 and 0.928. We used instead a code with rate 0.25 at the first level and looked for a high rate code that would gather enough extrinsic information to start the decoding process and correct all errors with an a priori information of 0.928. As shown in Fig. 5 , a code with rate 0.86 was a good compromise. It is interesting to note that despite the approximations made in the computation of the EXIT curves, the real decoding trajectory is close to the expected behavior.
C. Efficiency results
The results obtained for various values of the noise variance are summarized in table II. For each SNR, the size of the constellation X , the position of the constellation points and the probability distribution were optimized according to the procedure described in section II, to ensure |I(X;
0.005 bits while limiting the number of required codes to two. Let us point out that our method achieves good efficiency provided that two conditions are met. First, the constellation size required to maximize I(X; Y M ) should be |X | ≥ 4 so that two LDPC codes can be used. Second, the codes rates required
should not be too small so that we can construct good finite length codes. In practive this limited our simulations to situations where the SNR was above 2 dB. 
IV. OPPORTUNISTIC SECURITY FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
This section describes an explicit secret key agreement protocol for wireless channels, exploiting the reconciliation algorithm described earlier. The proposed scheme closely follows the general approach presented in section II, however all steps are modified to take into account the specific nature of the channels.
A. System Setup
We consider the wireless system depicted in sent by Alice through discrete-time Rayleigh-fading channels given by
where h M (i) (h W (i)) denotes the zero-mean fading coefficient of the main channel (wiretap channel), and
is a zero-mean complex Gaussian noise with variance N M (N W ). We further assume the fading coefficients and the noises to be independent, and the fading coefficients to remain constant over the transmission of several consecutive symbols (quasi-static fading). The instantaneous SNRs corresponding to a single realization (h M , h W ) of the fading coefficients are denoted γ M = |h M | 2 /N M and γ W = |h W | 2 /N W , and the instantaneous capacities are then C M = log 2 (1 + γ M ) and C W = log 2 (1 + γ W ). As shown in [37] , the instantaneous secrecy capacity is
B. Secure Communication Protocol
The fluctuations of the instantaneous secrecy capacity C s with time suggest the following opportunistic secret key agreement scheme (see also Fig. 7 ).
• Opportunistic transmissions. When the estimated instantaneous secrecy capacity C s and the instantaneous main channel capacity C M computed using the available CSI are greater than some thresholds C t s ≥ 0 and C t M ≥ 0, Alice transmits random symbols at a rate equal to the capacity C M using a Gaussian shaped Quadrature Amplitude Modulation scheme. We assume that Bob knows the channel fading coefficient h M and detects coherently the symbols sent by Alice, hence the fading channel can be viewed as two independent real Gaussian channels. The QAM constellation required to send close to C M bits/symbols can therefore be obtained by replicating the PAM scheme decribed in section II in two dimensions. This phase is called "opportunistic transmission" since Alice and Bob take advantage of the channel realizations where they know they can exchange more information than Eve can intercept. The threshold C t M is imposed by the reconciliation method which fails below a certain SNR, the choice of the threshold C t s will be discussed in the next section.
• Reconciliation and privacy amplification. When the estimated secrecy capacity or main channel capacity fall below their respective theresholds, Alice and Bob extract a secure key from the shared randomness previously obtained. The reconciliation algorithm described in section III allows Bob to recover Alice's symbols exactly, while limiting the additional information sent over the channel.
Privacy amplification with universal hash functions is then used to distill a secret key, taking into account all the information leaked to Eve during the opportunistic transmission and reconciliation stages.
• Secure communication. Alice and Bob can finally use their secret key to transmit messages, using either a one-time pad to ensure perfect secrecy or any symmetric cypher.
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Generate parities Notice that the randomness sharing and privacy amplification steps rely at this point on a perfect estimation of the fading coefficients to calculate the instantaneous secrecy capacity and then correctly estimate the length of the secret key to distill. As we will see shortly, this assumption can be somewhat alleviated to consider a more realistic situation where only imperfect CSI (or a conservative estimate) is available for the wiretap channel.
V. RESULTS

A. Performance Measures for Information-Theoretically Secure Communications
The performance of the opportunitic protocol in the case of perfect channel state information will be evaluated with the following two measures: average η-secure throughput T s (η) and the average η-communication throughput T c (η) . The average η-secure throughput T s (η) is defined as the average number of secured message bits transmitted per channel use, where η is the ratio of secret-key bits used per message bits (η ≤ 1). Note that in a secret key agreement scenario, the secret-key generation rate does not contribute to the η-secured throughput since the key itself does not convey any information.
When η = 1, T s (η) corresponds to a perfectly secure communication obtained with a one-time pad encryption, whereas T s (η) for η < 1 only represents an encrypted message rate with secret keys. If k s is the key length required for encryption, the corresponding key renewal rate is k s /η. Similarily the average η-communication throughput T c (η) is defined as the average number of non-secure message bits transmitted per channel use. In the case of secret-key agreement, the communication rate used for reconciliation and privacy amplification has to be deduced from the total communication throughput.
Let us now evaluate T s (η) for our protocol. Let D = (γ M , γ W ) : C s ≥ C t s , C M > C t M be the set of fading realizations for which an oportunistic transmission is performed and let D denote its complement in R 2 + . For a given random variable X depending on the fading realization, let X D denote its average over all fading realizations in D. We will assume that fading coefficients remain constant over the transmission of n ≫ 2s + 2 + r 0 symbols, where s and r 0 are the safety parameters used during privacy amplification.
We can then the neglect the penalty inflicted by privacy amplification and assume that the opportunistic transmissions provide on average
secret key bits per symbol transmitted, which can then be used to secure
bits of message per symbol. From section III, we know that reconciliation requires the transmission [38] and privacy amplication therefore requires the transmission of n rec − k bits. No hashing scheme is known to achieve this bound for any n rec , therefore we will consider the more realistic situation where privacy amplification requires the transmission of n rec bits. For instance, this can be achieved with the following family [26] :
where h c (x) is defined as n key distinct bits of the product cx in a polynomial representation of GF(2 nrec ).
Finally, since the maximum number of non-secure bits transmitted is at most the capacity of the main channel, we obtain:
Notice that T c (η) may be negative when P(C s ≥ C t s ) ≫ P(C s < C s t ). This situation corresponds to a regime where Alice and Bob generate keys faster than they use them, which can be avoided by adjusting the parameter C t so that T c (η) remains positive. In the remaining of the paper, we will be interested in the ultimate performance of the protocol, therefore according to section III we will assume H(X) ≈ C M + 2 but unless otherwise specified we will use C t M = 0 and β = 1. The maximum average secure throughput for η = 1 achievable by the opportunistic protocol is shown Fig. 8 . As expected the protocol is in general sub-optimal since most of the main channel capacity has to be sacrificed for key agreement. Interestingly when the wiretap channel average SNR γ W is well above the main channel average SNR γ M , all the additional communication required for reconciliation and privacy amplification as well as the communication secured by a one-time pad, can be performed when the secrecy capacity is zero. In this case, the protocol incurs no loss of secure communication rate. Fig. 9 shows the secure throughputs obtained for different values of η. Strictly speaking, the protocol does not provide any information theoretic security in this regime, since the keys generated are used to encode several bits. Nevertheless, this result shows that the protocol provides an efficient and potentially fast way of exchanging information-theoretically secure keys. In this mode of operation, it could be tailored with standard secure encryption algorithms (such as the AES with 192 bits) to strenghten the current level of security of wireless communications.
B. Mitigating the Effects of Imperfect CSI
Let us now briefly discuss the impact of imperfect channel state information. We can reasonably assume that Bob cooperates with Alice, which allows her to obtain a perfect estimate of the main channel fading coefficient. Unfortunately Eve may not be as helpful and Alice's knowledge of the wiretap fading is more likely to be noisy. In order to assess the performance of our protocol under more realistic conditions, we model Alice's estimate of Eve's fading coefficient byĥ W = h W + n W , where h W is the true fading coefficient and n W is a zero-mean complex Gaussian noise with known variance σ 2 per dimension. If
Alice applies the previous protocol blindly, her estimationĈ s of the instantaneous secrecy capacity will generally differ from the real secrecy capacity C s . The situations whereĈ s ≤ C s do not impact the secrecy of the key agreement, however whenĈ s > C s , Alice understimates the information leaked to the eavesdropper and subsequently generate keys whose entropy is not maximum. LetK denote thê k-bit key generated by Alice based on her estimationĈ s . From theorem 1, the uncertainty onK of the eavesdropper is bounded as follows:
where we have introduced the parameter α = r 0 /n. As long as C W −Ĉ W ≤ α, the uncertainty of the keŷ K lies within 1.5 bits of its maximal value and can be regarded as secret, however when C W −Ĉ W > α the lower bound on H(K|G, E = e) decreases exponentially in the difference
The introduction of imperfect CSI and the use of the parameter α slightly modify the expression of the average secure and communication given by Eq. (20) and (22) .
The threshold C t s ≥ α should once more be chosen such that T c (η) ≥ 0. Contrary to the situation where perfect CSI is available, the average secure throughput defined above is not sufficient to characterize the security of the system. In fact it only represents Alice's targeted secure communication rate, which might be different from the true secure communication rate. Hence we need to introduce the true average secure throughput R s and the average leaked throughput R l defined as:
These expressions cannot be computed in close form but can be obtained with Monte-Carlo simulations. Interestingly when Alice has a bad estimation of the wiretap channel fading coefficient and if the main channel SNR is well above the wiretap channel SNR, most of the keys generated are still secret.
This unexpected behavior can be explained by the asymmetry of the distribution p(γ W |γ W ) which forces
Alice to undersestimate C W most of the time. On the other hand when her estimations of the wiretap CSI improves, she becomes equally likely to overstimate or understimate C W , therefore R c ≈ R s and half of the keys generated are then insecure. The impact of imperfect of imperfect channel state information can be somewhat mitigated by increasing the parameter α. In fact, α > 0 plays the role of a safety margin and reduces the length of the generated keys. By increasing α, the average leaked throughput can be made arbitrarily small, but this also decreases the achievable secure throughput. Figure 11 shows the results obtained for α = 0.1. When σ 2 = 0.0001, the secure throughput loss is negligible, however this slight increase in α suffices to ensure the secrecy of the keys generated. The mitigation is less effective when σ 2 = 10, and a further increase of α would be necessary to reduce the leaked throughput. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In the second of this two-part paper on wireless information-theoretic security, we proposed a protocol based on one-way communications providing secure communication over quasi-static wireless channels.
This scheme opportunistically exploits the fluctuations of the fading coefficients to exchange informationtheoretially secure keys, which are then be used to encrypt messages. We analysed the security provided by the protocol in the idealized case where the channel state information of the wiretap channel is known, but also showed that secure communication is still achievable in the more realistic situation where only imperfect channel state information is available. The fundamental security limits in both scenarios were studied in Part I.
The performance and complexity of the proposed scheme mainly rely on those of the reconciliation algorithm. Our LDPC-based reconciliation method is near-optimal over a wide range of signal-to noise ratios, however the memory requirements and the complexity may still be too high for embedded or low-cost systems. In future work, we will investigate new code constructions to in order to reduce the hardware requirements while still maintaining the same level of performance.
Let us finally mention that even though the encryption used in our scheme could be performed with a one-time pad to ensure perfect security, the protocol may be of higher interest if tailored with existing secret-key encryption methods (e.g. DES, AES) to strenghten their current level of security.
